| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 1.7.x | ✅ |
| 1.6.x | ✅ |
| 1.5.x | ✅ |
| 1.4.x | |
| < 1.4 | ❌ |
Please do not open public issues for security vulnerabilities.
Report privately via either channel:
- GitHub: Private vulnerability report
- Email: sufiyanaasim@outlook.com with subject
SECURITY: QueueLess
Include: affected area (frontend / backend / Firebase rules / CI), steps to reproduce, impact assessment, and any suggested fix. You can expect an acknowledgement within 72 hours and a status update within 7 days.
In scope:
- Authentication / authorization bypass (JWT, RBAC roles, membership checks)
- Firebase security-rule weaknesses (data readable/writable that should not be)
- Injection (NoSQL, XSS, header), rate-limit bypass, CSRF
- Secrets exposure in code, builds, or CI logs
Out of scope:
- Denial of service against the free-tier hosting itself
- Issues requiring physical access to a kiosk device
- Social engineering
- Clients cannot write operational or content-bearing Firebase RTDB data; those writes go through the JWT-protected Express API using the Admin SDK. Scoped staff presence is the only direct client-write exception.
- Message, notification, and file content is served only via the API after server-side membership checks; RTDB carries content-free "signal" nodes for real-time refresh.
- Passwords and PINs are bcrypt-hashed; login and token issuance are rate-limited; the AI assistant is rate-limited per user.
- Sensitive admin actions are recorded in an append-only audit log.