fix: use constant-time comparison for callback signatures - #48
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The callback signature is currently compared using "==" or "===",These comparisons are not designed for sensitive cryptographic values and may return as soon as they find a different byte
Because of this, the response time can be slightly different depending on how much of the provided signature matches the expected signature. By sending many requests and measuring these timing differences, an attacker may be able to guess the signature step by step.
Using "hash_equals()" prevents this issue because it compares the signatures in constant time.