Update dependency yt-dlp to v2026 [SECURITY] by renovate[bot] · Pull Request #91 · dxsooo/VideoDownload

renovate · 2024-08-06T10:36:18Z

ℹ️ Note

This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
yt-dlp	`^2024.0.0` → `^2026.0.0`

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2024-38519

Summary

yt-dlp does not limit the extensions of downloaded files, which could lead to arbitrary filenames being created in the download folder (and path traversal on Windows). Since yt-dlp also reads config from the working directory (and on Windows executables will be executed from the yt-dlp directory) this could lead to arbitrary code being executed.

Patches

yt-dlp version 2024.07.01 fixes this issue by whitelisting the allowed extensions.
This means some very uncommon extensions might not get downloaded; however, it will also limit the possible exploitation surface.

Workarounds

It is recommended to upgrade yt-dlp to version 2024.07.01 as soon as possible, always have .%(ext)s at the end of the output template, and make sure you trust the websites that you are downloading from. Also, make sure to never download to a directory within PATH or other sensitive locations like your user directory, system32, or other binaries locations.

For users not able to upgrade:

Make sure the extension of the media to download is a common video/audio/sub/... one
Try to avoid the generic extractor (--ies default,-generic)
Keep the default output template (-o "%(title)s [%(id)s].%(ext)s)
Omit any of the subtitle options (--write-subs, --write-auto-subs, --all-subs, --write-srt)
Use --ignore-config --config-location ... to not load config from common locations

Details

One potential exploitation might look like this:

From a mimetype we do not know, we default to trimming the leading bit and using the remainder. Given a webpage that contains

<script type="application/ld+json">
{
    "@&#8203;context": "https://schema.org",
    "@&#8203;type": "VideoObject",
    "name": "ffmpeg",
    "encodingFormat": "video/exe",
    "contentUrl": "https://example.com/video.mp4"
}
</script>

this will try and download a file called ffmpeg.exe (-o "%(title)s.%(ext)s).
ffmpeg.exe will be searched for in the current directory, and so upon the next run arbitrary code can be executed.

Alternatively, when engineering a file called yt-dlp.conf to be created, the config file could contain --exec ... and so would also execute arbitrary code.

Acknowledgement

A big thanks to @JarLob for independently finding a new application of the same underlying issue.
More can be read about on the dedicated GitHub Security Lab disclosure here: Path traversal saving subtitles (GHSL-2024-090)

References

GHSA-3v33-3wmw-3785

Impact

yt-dlp's DouyuTV and DouyuShow extractors used a cdn.bootcdn.net URL as a fallback for fetching a component of the crypto-js JavaScript library. When the Douyu extractor is used, yt-dlp extracts this JavaScript code and attempts to execute it externally using PhantomJS. bootcdn.net is owned by the bad actor responsible for the Polyfill JS supply chain attack that has been ongoing since at least June 2023. While there is no evidence that PhantomJS has been targeted by or is vulnerable to any attacks carried out by the Polyfill JS actor, there is the possibility that malicious JavaScript code may have been downloaded/cached by yt-dlp or executed by PhantomJS.

In order for this potential vulnerability to be exploited by any hypothetical attack, all 3 of the following conditions must be met:

The user has PhantomJS installed on their system.
The user passes a douyu.com or douyutv.com URL to yt-dlp as input, or passes a URL that redirects to one of these domains.
cdnjs.cloudflare.com is unavailable or blocked at the time of extraction, necessitating the usage of the cdn.bootcdn.net fallback; or it had been unavailable during a previous run of the Douyu extractor and JavaScript code from cdn.bootcdn.net had been cached to disk.

Patches

yt-dlp version 2024.07.07 fixes this issue by removing the URL pointing to the malicious CDN and by invalidating any Douyu extractor cache data created by unpatched versions of yt-dlp.

Workarounds

It is recommended to upgrade yt-dlp to version 2024.07.07 as soon as possible.

For users not able to upgrade:

Avoid using the Douyu extractors (--ies default,-douyutv,-douyushow)
Uninstall (or do not install) PhantomJS

Acknowledgement

Thanks to @LeSuisse for reporting this promptly after bootcdn.net was discovered to be under control of the same bad actor behind the polyfill.io supply chain attack.

References

CVE-2026-26331

Summary

When yt-dlp's --netrc-cmd command-line option (or netrc_cmd Python API parameter) is used, an attacker could achieve arbitrary command injection on the user's system with a maliciously crafted URL.

Impact

yt-dlp maintainers assume the impact of this vulnerability to be high for anyone who uses --netrc-cmd in their command/configuration or netrc_cmd in their Python scripts. Even though the maliciously crafted URL itself will look very suspicious to many users, it would be trivial for a maliciously crafted webpage with an inconspicuous URL to covertly exploit this vulnerability via HTTP redirect. Users without --netrc-cmd in their arguments or netrc_cmd in their scripts are unaffected. No evidence has been found of this exploit being used in the wild.

Patches

yt-dlp version 2026.02.21 fixes this issue by validating all netrc "machine" values and raising an error upon unexpected input.

Workarounds

It is recommended to upgrade yt-dlp to version 2026.02.21 as soon as possible.

Users who are unable to upgrade should avoid using the --netrc-cmd command-line option (or netrc_cmd Python API parameter), or they should at least not pass a placeholder ({}) in their --netrc-cmd argument.

Details

yt-dlp's --netrc-cmd option can be used to run any arbitrary shell command to retrieve site login credentials so that the user doesn't have to store the credentials as plaintext in the filesystem. The --netrc-cmd argument is a shell command with an optional placeholder ({}). If the placeholder is present in the argument, it is replaced with the netrc "machine" value, which specifies the site for which login credentials are needed.

The netrc "machine" value is usually explicitly defined in yt-dlp's extractor code for a given site. However, yt-dlp has four extractors where the netrc "machine" value needs to be dynamically sourced from the site's hostname. And in three of those extractors (GetCourseRuIE, TeachableIE and TeachableCourseIE), wildcard matches are allowed for one or more subdomains of the hostname. This can result in a netrc "machine" value that contains special shell characters.

The --netrc-cmd argument is executed by a modified version of Python's subprocess.Popen with shell=True, which means that any special characters may be interpreted by the host shell, potentially leading to arbitrary command injection.

Here is an example of maliciously crafted URL input that exploits the vulnerability:

> yt-dlp --netrc-cmd "echo {}" "https://;echo pwned>&2;#.getcourse.ru/video"
[GetCourseRu] Executing command: echo getcourseru
WARNING: [GetCourseRu] Failed to parse .netrc: bad toplevel token 'getcourseru' (-, line 2)
[GetCourseRu] Extracting URL: https://;echo pwned>&2;#.getcourse.ru/video
[GetCourseRu] Executing command: echo ;echo pwned>&2;
pwned
[GetCourseRu] No authenticators for ;echo pwned>&2;
[GetCourseRu] video: Downloading webpage

Although only 3 of yt-dlp's extractors are directly susceptible to this attack, yt-dlp's "generic" extractor will follow HTTP redirects and try to match the resulting URL with one of the dedicated extractors. This means that any URL processed by the generic extractor could ultimately lead to a maliciously crafted URL that is matched by one of the vulnerable extractors. Hypothetically, an attacker could create a website with an inconspicuous URL and legitimate-looking media content that would serve an HTTP redirect to a maliciously crafted URL when it detects a request from yt-dlp.

References

Release Notes

yt-dlp/yt-dlp (yt-dlp)

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GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

Summary

Patches

Workarounds

Details

Acknowledgement

References

Impact

Patches

Workarounds

Acknowledgement

References

Summary

Impact

Patches

Workarounds

Details

References

Release Notes

Important changes

Core changes

Extractor changes

Downloader changes

Networking changes

Misc. changes

Important changes

Core changes

Extractor changes

Misc. changes

Core changes

Extractor changes

Core changes

Extractor changes

Extractor changes

Misc. changes

Important changes

Core changes

Extractor changes

Misc. changes

Important changes

Core changes

Extractor changes

Configuration

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renovate bot commented Feb 24, 2026

⚠️ Artifact update problem

File name: poetry.lock

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