Bridge session key encryption cache to decryption cache (#495)#487
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…firm When the submitter encrypts session key randomness for each recipient, also store (encryptedRandomness → plainRandomness) in the decryption cache. When the same participant later acts as a confirmer for its own transaction, getSessionKeyRandomness finds a cache hit and skips the expensive ECIES private-key decryption. Today, the submitter's participant encrypts session keys (ECIES) for N recipients, sends to sequencer, receives the same encrypted views back as a confirmer, and decrypts them — redundantly performing ECIES decrypt on data it just encrypted. With ~20 SVs on the Global Synchronizer, this wastes ~8ms of ECIES work per self-confirmed transaction. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This was referenced Apr 16, 2026
elliottdehn
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The decryption cache pre-population makes sense, I'll merge it. |
soren-da
approved these changes
Apr 21, 2026
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Closes #495
Summary
When a submitter encrypts session key randomness for N recipients, also store
(encryptedRandomness → plainRandomness)in the decryption cache. When the same participant later confirms its own transaction, the ECIES decrypt is a cache hit — no asymmetric crypto needed.Impact
Decrypt-side savings (confirming participant, self-confirmed transactions only):
Only applies to self-confirmed transactions — when the submitting participant is also a confirmer (which is the common case: the submitter is always an informee of its own transaction).
Does NOT help other confirmers (SVs confirming someone else's transaction). Their decrypt cost is unchanged.
7 lines of code. Zero risk — just populating a cache that already exists.
Relation to other PRs
Test plan
SimplestPingIntegrationTestpasses🤖 Generated with Claude Code