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Bump dependencies#3479

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jmthomas wants to merge 2 commits into
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dependencies
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Bump dependencies#3479
jmthomas wants to merge 2 commits into
mainfrom
dependencies

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@jmthomas jmthomas requested review from mcosgriff and ryanmelt June 17, 2026 15:46
@jmthomas jmthomas marked this pull request as ready for review June 17, 2026 15:46
@socket-security

socket-security Bot commented Jun 17, 2026

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Codecov Report

✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.
✅ Project coverage is 79.23%. Comparing base (f29c725) to head (1ffb469).

Additional details and impacted files
@@            Coverage Diff             @@
##             main    #3479      +/-   ##
==========================================
- Coverage   79.25%   79.23%   -0.02%     
==========================================
  Files         689      689              
  Lines       57293    57293              
  Branches      728      728              
==========================================
- Hits        45406    45396      -10     
- Misses      11809    11819      +10     
  Partials       78       78              
Flag Coverage Δ
python 80.30% <ø> (+0.01%) ⬆️
ruby-api 81.02% <ø> (-0.31%) ⬇️
ruby-backend 83.09% <ø> (ø)

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arches.zip(new_paths).each do |arch, path|
url = "https://github.com/versity/versitygw/releases/download/#{version}/versitygw_#{version}_Linux_#{arch}.tar.gz"
puts " Downloading #{url}"
unless system("curl -fSL #{url} -o #{path}")

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Possible command injection via exec()-type functions - critical severity
Ruby has many ways to do system calls, including syscall, system, exec, but also %x() and the use of backticks. Backticks (``) in Ruby are very dangerous and counter-intuitive. These are not single quotes ('). Ruby automatically attempts to execute the contents of the backticks as a shell command and the output will be returned.

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Remediation: If possible, avoid using these functions altogether. If not, use a list of allowed inputs that can feed into these functions.

Reply @AikidoSec ignore: [REASON] to ignore this issue.
More info

# True if both Linux release tarballs for `version` already exist in openc3-buckets.
def versitygw_binaries_present?(version)
%w[arm64 x86_64].all? do |arch|
File.exist?(File.join(ROOT_DIR, 'openc3-buckets', "versitygw_#{version}_Linux_#{arch}.tar.gz"))

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Path traversal attack possible - high severity
A malicious actor could control the location of this file, which may allow them to retrieve, write or delete files outside of the intended folder.

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Remediation: To address this, ensure that user-controlled variables in file paths are sanitized at least to not contain '..' or forward slashes.

Reply @AikidoSec ignore: [REASON] to ignore this issue.
More info

def download_versitygw_binaries(version)
buckets_dir = File.join(ROOT_DIR, 'openc3-buckets')
arches = %w[arm64 x86_64]
new_paths = arches.map { |arch| File.join(buckets_dir, "versitygw_#{version}_Linux_#{arch}.tar.gz") }

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Path traversal attack possible - medium severity
A malicious actor could control the location of this file, which may allow them to retrieve, write or delete files outside of the intended folder.

Show fix

Remediation: To address this, ensure that user-controlled variables in file paths are sanitized at least to not contain '..' or forward slashes.

Reply @AikidoSec ignore: [REASON] to ignore this issue.
More info

@sonarqubecloud

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