π‘οΈ Sentinel: [security improvement] CSP base-uri μ ν κ°ν - #105
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [security improvement] CSP base-uri μ ν κ°ν#105seonghobae wants to merge 1 commit into
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Pull request overview
This PR tightens the siteβs CSP for the static GitHub Pages homepage by forbidding <base> tag usage, reducing the risk of base-tag injection leading to DOM-based XSS or URL/path manipulation.
Changes:
- Update
index.htmlCSP frombase-uri 'self'tobase-uri 'none'. - Document the security hardening in
CHANGELOG.md. - Add a Sentinel security journal entry describing the base-uri injection prevention rationale.
Reviewed changes
Copilot reviewed 3 out of 3 changed files in this pull request and generated 1 comment.
| File | Description |
|---|---|
| index.html | Tightens CSP by setting base-uri 'none' to prevent <base>-based injection/rewrites. |
| CHANGELOG.md | Records the CSP base-uri hardening under [Unreleased]. |
| .jules/sentinel.md | Adds a security learning/prevention entry for base-uri injection mitigation. |
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| **Vulnerability:** Missing input validation on `setLanguage()` could allow invalid strings (like Prototype Pollution payloads or arbitrary text) to be applied to the DOM (`lang` attribute) and stored in `localStorage`. | ||
| **Learning:** The global `setLanguage` function assumed inputs would only come from predefined button clicks, skipping runtime validation. | ||
| **Prevention:** Always sanitize and validate function arguments at the application boundary, even if the primary caller is trusted, to enforce defense in depth. | ||
| ## 2024-07-25 - [Base URI Injection λ°©μ§] |
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Closing as already implemented on |
Understood. Acknowledging that this work is now obsolete and stopping work on this task. |
π¨ Severity: MEDIUM
π‘ Vulnerability: λͺ μμ μΈ
<base>νκ·Έκ° λΆνμν μ μ μ¬μ΄νΈμμ CSPμbase-uri 'self'κ° μ€μ λμ΄ μμ΄, μ μμ μΈ λ² μ΄μ€ νκ·Έ μΈμ μ 곡격μ ν΅ν DOM κΈ°λ° XSSλ κ²½λ‘ μ‘°μ 곡격μ μ¬μ§κ° μ‘΄μ¬νμ΅λλ€.π― Impact: μ·¨μ½μ λ ΈμΆ μ, μ¬μ©μμ μΈμ νμ·¨ λ° μ¬μ΄νΈ λ΄ μ μ± μ€ν¬λ¦½νΈ μ€νμ΄ κ°λ₯ν μ μμ΅λλ€.
π§ Fix:
index.htmlνμΌμ Content Security Policy(CSP) μ€μ μμbase-uri 'self'λ₯Όbase-uri 'none'μΌλ‘ λ³κ²½νμ¬ λ² μ΄μ€ νκ·Έ μΈμ μ 곡격μ μμ² μ°¨λ¨νμ΅λλ€.β Verification: ν μ€νΈ μ€μνΈκ° λͺ¨λ ν΅κ³Όνλ κ²μ νμΈνμκ³ νλ‘ νΈμλ κ²μ¦μ ν΅ν΄ CSP λ©ν νκ·Έκ° μ¬λ°λ₯΄κ² μ μ©λ¨μ νμΈνμ΅λλ€.
PR created automatically by Jules for task 4553777671447210037 started by @seonghobae