fix(secure-os): fix attribution to artemisclaw82, soften unverified claim, add cross-reference to existing privacy OS page

Author: artemisclaw82

docs/pages/opsec/secure-operating-systems.mdx

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ tags:
   - Engineer/Developer
 contributors:
   - role: wrote
-    users: [dickson]
+    users: [artemisclaw82]
   - role: reviewed
     users: []
   - role: fact-checked
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ import { TagList, AttributionList, TagProvider, TagFilter, ContributeFooter } fr
 > 🔑 **Key Takeaway:** Use compartmentalized operating systems to isolate sensitive operations from everyday browsing.
 > Qubes OS for desktop, GrapheneOS for mobile, Tails for ephemeral sessions.
 
-Infostealer malware is the leading initial access vector in Web3 compromises. A single infected machine can exfiltrate
+Infostealer malware is among the most common initial access vectors in Web3 compromises. A single infected machine can exfiltrate
 browser sessions, wallet keys, SSH credentials, and authentication tokens in seconds. Standard operating systems
 (Windows, macOS, mainstream Linux) run all applications in the same trust domain — one compromised app can access
 everything.
@@ -192,6 +192,8 @@ If a dedicated secure OS is not feasible, harden your existing setup:
 
 ## Further Reading
 
+> **Note:** For a general overview of privacy-focused operating systems and tools (including Whonix, Tor Browser, VeraCrypt), see [Privacy-Focused Operating Systems and Tools](/privacy/privacy-focused-operating-systems-tools). This page focuses on Web3-specific threat models and deployment configurations.
+
 - [Qubes OS Documentation](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/)
 - [GrapheneOS Features](https://grapheneos.org/features)
 - [Tails Documentation](https://tails.net/doc/)