diff --git a/.jules/sentinel.md b/.jules/sentinel.md
index f88bf46..e295aee 100644
--- a/.jules/sentinel.md
+++ b/.jules/sentinel.md
@@ -112,3 +112,7 @@
 **Vulnerability:** Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via `javascript:` URIs in `href` attributes in `scanner/dashboard/index.html`.
 **Learning:** `f.references` values (URLs) were injected into `href` attributes with only HTML entity escaping via `esc()`. HTML escaping `javascript:alert(1)` does not neutralize the `javascript:` URI protocol, meaning that clicking the link executes the injected script in the context of the dashboard UI. This allowed an attacker controlling finding references to achieve XSS.
 **Prevention:** Always validate the URL scheme (allow-listing `http:` and `https:`) using `new URL()` parser to ensure user-provided URLs cannot leverage dangerous schemes like `javascript:`, `file:`, or `data:` when injected into `href` attributes, before applying standard HTML escaping.
+## 2026-07-25 - Prevent SSRF Bypasses via HTTP Redirects
+**Vulnerability:** HTTP clients using `urllib.request.urlopen` followed HTTP redirects automatically, bypassing initial SSRF and LFI checks (like `_is_safe_url`) on the origin URL and allowing redirection to internal network locations or sensitive IP addresses (e.g., `http://127.0.0.1/` or `http://169.254.169.254/`).
+**Learning:** `_is_safe_url` checking only the initial URL does not protect against SSRF bypasses via `301`/`302` HTTP redirects since standard library clients follow redirects blindly to any valid URL scheme/host.
+**Prevention:** Always implement and enforce a custom redirect handler (`urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler`) attached to a custom opener (`urllib.request.build_opener`) and re-apply `_is_safe_url` checks inside `redirect_request` for every redirect hop.
diff --git a/appguardrail_core/controlplane.py b/appguardrail_core/controlplane.py
index 07300b0..3896715 100644
--- a/appguardrail_core/controlplane.py
+++ b/appguardrail_core/controlplane.py
@@ -18,9 +18,11 @@
 import secrets
 import sqlite3
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from importlib import resources  # nosemgrep: python.lang.compatibility.python37.python37-compatibility-importlib2
+import importlib.resources as resources  # nosemgrep: python.lang.compatibility.python37.python37-compatibility-importlib2
 from typing import Any, Iterable
 from urllib.parse import parse_qs, urlparse
+import urllib.request
+import urllib.error
 
 from .findings import is_deploy_blocking, normalize_findings, severity_counts
 
@@ -220,7 +222,9 @@ def _is_safe_url(url: str) -> bool:
     import socket
 
     try:
-        parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)  # nosemgrep: python.lang.security.audit.dynamic-urllib-use-detected.dynamic-urllib-use-detected
+        parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(
+            url
+        )  # nosemgrep: python.lang.security.audit.dynamic-urllib-use-detected.dynamic-urllib-use-detected
     except ValueError:
         return False
 
@@ -270,6 +274,17 @@ def is_bad_ip(ip) -> bool:
     return True
 
 
+import urllib.request
+import urllib.error
+
+
+class SafeRedirectHandler(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
+    def redirect_request(self, req, fp, code, msg, headers, newurl):
+        if not _is_safe_url(newurl):
+            raise urllib.error.URLError(f"Unsafe redirect URL: {newurl}")
+        return super().redirect_request(req, fp, code, msg, headers, newurl)
+
+
 def _send_alert(
     url: str,
     payload: dict[str, Any],
@@ -301,7 +316,8 @@ def _send_alert(
             method="POST",
             headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
         )
-        urllib.request.urlopen(  # nosemgrep: python.lang.security.audit.dynamic-urllib-use-detected.dynamic-urllib-use-detected
+        opener = urllib.request.build_opener(SafeRedirectHandler())
+        opener.open(  # nosemgrep: python.lang.security.audit.dynamic-urllib-use-detected.dynamic-urllib-use-detected
             req, timeout=10
         )  # noqa: S310 - Safe URL scheme validated
         return True
diff --git a/scanner/cli/appguardrail.py b/scanner/cli/appguardrail.py
index 43a7678..059a4d5 100644
--- a/scanner/cli/appguardrail.py
+++ b/scanner/cli/appguardrail.py
@@ -60,20 +60,28 @@
 from appguardrail_core.config import load_config
 from appguardrail_core.external import build_external_scan_plan
 from appguardrail_core.findings import NON_BLOCKING_CONTEXTS
-from appguardrail_core.findings import \
-    is_deploy_blocking as core_is_deploy_blocking
+from appguardrail_core.findings import is_deploy_blocking as core_is_deploy_blocking
 from appguardrail_core.findings import normalize_findings
-from appguardrail_core.language import (LANGUAGE_EXTENSIONS,
-                                        detect_language_axes,
-                                        detect_stack_profile)
-from appguardrail_core.org_bundle import (OrgBundleError,
-                                          annotate_missing_pr_repositories,
-                                          gh_error_message, gh_pr_list,
-                                          gh_repo_list)
+from appguardrail_core.language import (
+    LANGUAGE_EXTENSIONS,
+    detect_language_axes,
+    detect_stack_profile,
+)
+from appguardrail_core.org_bundle import (
+    OrgBundleError,
+    annotate_missing_pr_repositories,
+    gh_error_message,
+    gh_pr_list,
+    gh_repo_list,
+)
 from appguardrail_core.org_bundle import load_json as load_org_json
 from appguardrail_core.org_bundle import render_org_evidence, write_bundle
-from appguardrail_core.reports import (REPORT_TYPE_LABELS, ReportContext,
-                                       render_report, supported_report_types)
+from appguardrail_core.reports import (
+    REPORT_TYPE_LABELS,
+    ReportContext,
+    render_report,
+    supported_report_types,
+)
 from appguardrail_core.rules import build_rule_metadata
 
 __version__ = "0.1.1"
@@ -1661,6 +1669,17 @@ def is_bad_ip(ip) -> bool:
     return True
 
 
+import urllib.request
+import urllib.error
+
+
+class SafeRedirectHandler(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
+    def redirect_request(self, req, fp, code, msg, headers, newurl):
+        if not _is_safe_url(newurl):
+            raise urllib.error.URLError(f"Unsafe redirect URL: {newurl}")
+        return super().redirect_request(req, fp, code, msg, headers, newurl)
+
+
 def _push_findings(url, findings):
     """POST normalized findings to a control-plane /api/v1/scans endpoint."""
     import urllib.error
@@ -1695,7 +1714,8 @@ def _push_findings(url, findings):
         },
     )
     try:
-        with urllib.request.urlopen(  # nosemgrep: python.lang.security.audit.dynamic-urllib-use-detected.dynamic-urllib-use-detected
+        opener = urllib.request.build_opener(SafeRedirectHandler())
+        with opener.open(  # nosemgrep: python.lang.security.audit.dynamic-urllib-use-detected.dynamic-urllib-use-detected
             req, timeout=15
         ) as resp:  # noqa: S310 - Safe URL scheme validated
             body = json.loads(resp.read() or b"{}")
diff --git a/tests/test_controlplane.py b/tests/test_controlplane.py
index eb6b40d..beea829 100644
--- a/tests/test_controlplane.py
+++ b/tests/test_controlplane.py
@@ -8,13 +8,23 @@
 
 import pytest
 
-from appguardrail_core.controlplane import (_is_slack_webhook, _send_alert,
-                                            _slack_blocks, add_scan, connect,
-                                            create_key, create_org, get_scan,
-                                            has_role, list_scans,
-                                            make_control_plane_server,
-                                            org_for_key, role_for_key,
-                                            scan_trend, set_webhook)
+from appguardrail_core.controlplane import (
+    _is_slack_webhook,
+    _send_alert,
+    _slack_blocks,
+    add_scan,
+    connect,
+    create_key,
+    create_org,
+    get_scan,
+    has_role,
+    list_scans,
+    make_control_plane_server,
+    org_for_key,
+    role_for_key,
+    scan_trend,
+    set_webhook,
+)
 
 FINDINGS = [
     {"severity": "CRITICAL", "rule_id": "x", "context": "app-code"},
@@ -361,7 +371,14 @@ class _R:  # minimal stand-in, urlopen result is ignored
 
         return _R()
 
-    monkeypatch.setattr(urllib.request, "urlopen", _fake_urlopen)
+    def _fake_build_opener(*handlers):
+        class _Opener:
+            def open(self, req, timeout=None):
+                return _fake_urlopen(req, timeout=timeout)
+
+        return _Opener()
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(urllib.request, "build_opener", _fake_build_opener)
     generic = {
         "event": "drift.new_blocking",
         "org_id": 3,
diff --git a/tests/test_ssrf_protection.py b/tests/test_ssrf_protection.py
index 8cb0884..3bcfdfa 100644
--- a/tests/test_ssrf_protection.py
+++ b/tests/test_ssrf_protection.py
@@ -58,3 +58,40 @@ def test_is_safe_url_mapped_ips():
 def test_is_safe_url_reserved_and_not_global_ips():
     assert not _is_safe_url("http://255.255.255.255/")
     assert not _is_safe_url("http://0.0.0.0/")
+
+
+def test_safe_redirect_blocks_unsafe_url():
+    from appguardrail_core.controlplane import SafeRedirectHandler
+    import urllib.error
+    import pytest
+
+    handler = SafeRedirectHandler()
+
+    with pytest.raises(urllib.error.URLError) as exc:
+        handler.redirect_request(None, None, 302, "Found", None, "http://127.0.0.1/")
+
+    assert "Unsafe redirect URL" in str(exc.value)
+
+    with pytest.raises(urllib.error.URLError) as exc:
+        handler.redirect_request(
+            None, None, 302, "Found", None, "http://169.254.169.254/"
+        )
+
+    assert "Unsafe redirect URL" in str(exc.value)
+
+    # Safe url should fall through and not raise URLError on our end, might raise AttributeError on None but we can mock it
+    class DummyReq:
+        pass
+
+    class DummyFP:
+        pass
+
+    class DummyHeaders:
+        pass
+
+    try:
+        handler.redirect_request(
+            DummyReq(), DummyFP(), 302, "Found", DummyHeaders(), "https://github.com/"
+        )
+    except AttributeError:
+        pass  # this means super().redirect_request was called